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Lynch v. Donnelly: The Disappearing Wall
The establishment clause of the first amendment1 has created controversy
and vigorous debate among both commentators and the courts. In 1947 the
United States Supreme Court stated that the establishment clause "has erected a
wall between church and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable. ' 2
In Lynch v. Donnelly,3 however, the Court concluded that the concept of a
"wall" of separation "is not a wholly accurate description."'4 The disagreement
about the utility of this metaphor exemplifies the Court's ongoing struggle to
find the appropriate relationship between religion and government.5 Faced with
that struggle, the Lynch Court applied the three-pronged 6 test enunciated in
Lemon v. Kurtzman,7 and ruled that a city's ownership and erection of a nativity
scene as part of its annual Christmas display did not violate the establishment
clause.8
This Note examines the Lynch Court's application of the Lemon test. It
concludes that the Court, disregarding Justice Brennan's vigorous dissent, ap-
plied the Lemon test in a superficial manner. This relaxed application of the test
resulted in a retreat from the only viable tool for determining whether the estab-
lishment clause has been violated.
To understand the Lynch decision, it is necessary to understand the objec-
tives of both the establishment clause and the Lemon test itself. Discussing the
I
1. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion ... " U.S. CONST.
amend. I. The establishment clause is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
For a thorough discussion of the establishment clause-its origin, the Framers' intent, and an
analysis of case law-see R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND
CURRENT FICTION (1982); L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM (1953); Van Alstyne,
Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson's Crumbling Wall-A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly,
1984 DUKE L.J. 770 (analysis of the history of the establishment clause).
For various commentators' definitions of religion as an aid to interpreting the establishment
clause, see Greenwalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 753 (1984);
Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1056 (1978); Note, Religion
and Morality Legislation: A Reexamination of Establishment Clause Analysis, 59 N.Y.U. L. Rnv.
301 (1984).
2. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
3. 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
4. Id. at 1359.
5. "It has never been thought. . . possible. . . to enforce a regime of total separation, and as
a consequence cases arising under these Clauses have presented some of the most perplexing ques-
tions to come before this Court." Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413
U.S. 756, 760 (1972) (referring to establishment clause and free exercise clause). Illustrative of the
Court's struggle with the establishment clause is its failure to reach unanimity in numerous deci-
sions. See infra note 65.
Commentators also have disagreed. Robert L. Cord has stated that he and Leo Pfeffer "funda-
mentally disagree as to precisely what constitutional separation correctly entails." R. CORD, supra
note 1, at 15. Cord disputes the strict separationist approach of Pfeffer. For Pfeffer's viewpoint, see
L. PFEFFER, supra note 1.
6. See Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1362 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 657 (1971) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring)).
7. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
8. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1358.
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objectives of the establishment clause, Chief Justice Burger, in Walz v. Tax Com-
mission,9 focused on what the Framers of the first amendment believed the " 'es-
tablishment' of a religion connoted[-namely,] sponsorship, financial support
and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity." 10 In later cases
the Supreme Court has referred to these three elements as "the three main
evils" 11 that the establishment clause sought to prevent.1 2
With these evils in mind, 13 the Court developed the three-pronged Lemon
test for determining whether a governmental activity violates the establishment
clause. 14 To be upheld, the activity (1) must have a secular purpose;15 (2) must
have a principal or primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion; 16
9. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
10. Id. at 668.
11. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612; see Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 359 (1975); Committee for
Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
672, 677 (1971).
12. The Supreme Court also has articulated the meaning of the establishment clause as follows:
The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither
a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid
one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor
influence a person... to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion .... No tax in any
amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities. . . whatever they
may be called, or whatever form they [take].
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947). Even though this definition is a broad, uncom-
promising prohibition against the establishment of religion, the Court in Everson upheld the chal-
lenged government activity-reimbursement to parents for the cost of transporting children to
parochial schools-because the state need not act as religion's adversary. The Court noted, "State
power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them." Id. at 18.
This definition of the establishment clause has been quoted in later decisions. See Walz, 397
U.S. at 670 (constitutional to grant tax exemptions to religious organizations for properties used
solely for religious purposes); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106 (1968) (unconstitutional to
impose "anti-evolution" statute on teachers); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 250 (1968)
(Black, J., dissenting) (constitutional to require public authorities to lend books, free of charge, to all
students, including those in private sectarian schools).
13. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
14. Id. at 612-13. The Court developed the Lemon test by examining prior decisions that ad-
dressed whether a government activity violated the establishment clause. As such the test was a
compilation of previous analyses. The first two prongs initially were articulated in Abington School
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963), and the third prong originated in Walz, 397 U.S. at 74.
15. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. For an example of the Court's use of the first prong of the Lemon
test, see Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam). In Stone the Court noted that the
purpose behind posting the Ten Commandments in public classrooms was "plainly religious in na-
ture. . . .[N]o legislative recitation of a supposed secular purpose can blind us to that fact." Id. at
41. Thus, due to the absence of a valid secular purpose, the Kentucky statute requiring the posting
of the Ten Commandments was held unconstitutional.
16. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. The "effect" prong embodies the principle of government "neu-
trality'--a principle that the Court recognized prior to the Schempp decision. As early as 1947,
Justice Rutledge stated that public funding for parochial schools can be constitutional only if the
funding does not "aid, promote, encourage, or sustain religious teaching or observances." Everson
v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 53 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). The majority in Everson insisted
that the first amendment "requires the state to be neutral in its relations with groups of religious
believers and non-believers." Id. at 18. In Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1968), the Court stated
that " 'if a religious leaven is to be worked into the affairs of our people, it is to be done by individu-
als and groups, not by the Government."' Id. at 443 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting McGowan
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 563 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting)). The Court stated explicitly that the
government cannot advance or inhibit religion, but instead must remain impartial. See generally
Kirkland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1968) (discussing
both the establishment clause and the free exercise clause to conclude that government cannot use
religion to confer benefits or impose burdens); Weiss, Privilege, Posture and Protection: "Religion" in
1985]
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and (3) must not foster an " 'excessive entanglement with religion.' "17 If a gov-
ernment's activity "violates any of these three principles, it must be struck
down." 18
In Lynch a Pawtucket, Rhode Island taxpayer challenged the city's inclu-
sion of a life-sized nativity scene in its annual Christmas display.19 The city paid
for the creche and hired workers to erect and dismantle it.20 Although the city
erected the display in a private park, its affiliation with the display was clear.2 1
At trial Mayor Lynch stated that the city assembled the display to increase com-
mercial activity, 22 to promote morale,2 3 and to acknowledge the heritage of a
national holiday,24 rather than to endorse religion in general, or Christianity
specifically.2 5
The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island applied
the Lemon test2 6 and concluded that the city's inclusion of the creche violated
the establishment clause.2 7 The United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit affirmed.2 8 The court of appeals, however, applied the test articulated in
Larson v. Valente 29 instead of the Lemon test.30 The Larson test-used when
the challenged activity discriminates among religions-requires a governmental
the Law, 73 YALE L.J. 593 (1964) (discussing both the establishment clause and the free exercise
clause to conclude that law cannot enter private domain of religion).
17. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 1613 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 674).
18. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40-41 (1980) (per curiam). In the recent case of Larkin v.
Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1983), the Court stressed that each of the three prongs of the
Lemon test must be satisfied independently for the government activity "to pass muster under the
Establishment Clause." Id. at 123.
In other cases, however, the Court has referred to the test as a mere "guideline." See Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 349 (1975); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678 (1971). The Lynch
Court followed the Meek approach. See Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1363. Justice Brennan, however,
stressed the importance of the Lemon test, characterizing it as "the fundamental tool of Establish-
ment Clause analysis." Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1371 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
19. Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1156 (D.R.I. 1981), aff'd, 691 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir.
1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984). The display also included a talking wishing well, Santa's house,
a group of carolers, houses and a church, five-pointed stars, Christmas trees, reindeer, and a banner
reading "Seasons Greetings." Id. at 1155.
20. The purchase price of the creche was $1365. The city estimated that the cost of erecting,
dismantling, and illuminating the creche was approximately $40 per year. This estimate included
only the cost pertaining to the creche itself and not the whole display. Id. at 1156,
21. "[Ihe opening ceremonies at the park [were] conducted by the Mayor, officiating in con-
junction with Santa Claus, who arrive[d] on a City firetruck. When the main switch [was) thrown,
the lights at City Hall [were] illuminated simultaneously with those in Hodgson Park." Id. at 1176.
22. The display was located in the heart of the shopping district. Id. at 1154.
23. Id. at 1158.
24. Id. at 1170.
25. But see id. at 1173 ("If the City indeed regarded the role of the nativity scene in the display
as a neutral recognition of a cultural phenomenon devoid of any significant quantum of religious
meaning or any endorsement of a religious message, it would not consider deletion of the creche a
blow to religion.").
26. Id. at 1162.
27. Id. at 1181. The court based its holding on the fact that the inclusion of the creche violated
the first two prongs of the Lemon test. Id. at 1170-77.
28. Donnelly v. Lynch, 691 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
29. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
30. The court of appeals applied the Larson test "because the City's ownership and use of the
nativity scene is an act which discriminates between Christian and non-Christian religions." Don-
nelly v. Lynch, 691 F.2d 1029, 1034 (lst Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
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activity to be invalidated unless it "'is justified by a compelling governmental
interest'" and "'is closely fitted to further that interest.' -31 The United States
Supreme Court returned to the district court's application of the Lemon test, but
upheld the display as constitutional. The Court stressed that the focus of its
inquiry must be "on the creche in the context of the Christmas season ...
Focus exclusively on the religious component of any activity would inevitably
lead to its invalidation under the Establishment Clause."'32
Discussing the first prong of the test, the Court determined that Pawtucket
had a valid secular purpose for including the creche in the display. Chief Justice
Burger, writing for the majority, focused on the Christmas display as a whole.
He concluded that Pawtucket's dual desire to celebrate Christmas and to depict
the origins of the holiday were constitutionally permissible purposes supporting
government activity.
3 3
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion based its analysis of the first prong
on "whether the government intend[ed] to convey a message of endorsement or
disapproval of religion."' 34 She concluded that Pawtucket did not intend to en-
dorse religion, but rather intended to celebrate a public holiday through a dis-
play of its traditional symbols.
35
Justice Brennan, in dissent, countered both Chief Justice Burger's and Jus-
tice O'Connor's analyses. He focused on Pawtucket's purpose in including the
creche in the display, rather than its purpose in erecting the display.36 Because
the creche is a distinctly religious symbol, Justice Brennan insisted that "a nar-
rower sectarian purpose lay behind the decision to include" the creche. 37 The
use of the creche implied "the City's support for the sectarian symbolism that
the nativity scene evoke[d]"; 38 thus, inclusion of the creche constituted an en-
31. Id. at 1034 (quoting Larson, 456 U.S. at 247). The court of appeals, affirming the district
court's decision, agreed with the district court's analysis of the first two prongs of the Lemon test.
Because the district court could not find any legitimate secular purpose behind the inclusion of the
creche, the court of appeals concluded that "it is hardly necessary to inquire whether a compelling
purpose or interest can be shown" under the Larson test. Id. at 1035.
32. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1362. The district court, however, did not focus on the display as a
whole because it did not believe that the secular nature of the entire display neutralized the explicitly
religious nature of the creche itself. "Santa Claus is not rendered religious by Iris proximity to the
creche; the creche is not rendered secular by its proximity to Santa Claus." Donnelly v. Lynch, 525
F. Supp. 1150, 1177 (D.R.I. 1981), aff'd, 691 F.2d 1029 (lst Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 1355
(1984). "The Government cannot insulate its motives for using an object with religious significance
from scrutiny merely by commingling it with a plethora of non-religious objects." Id. at 1169; see
supra note 19.
33. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1363. The district court, however, believed that "Pawtucket's use of a
patently religious symbol raises an inference that the City approved and intended to promote the
theological message that the symbol conveys." Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1172 (D.R.I.
1981), aff'd, 691 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984). Therefore, the court
concluded that the activity lacked a valid secular purpose. Id. at 1174.
34. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1368 (O'Connor, I., concurring) (emphasis added).
35. Id. at 1368 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
36. Id. at 1373 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
37. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan claimed that "[tfhe City. . .understood that
the inclusion of the creche . . . would serve the wholly religious purpose of 'keep[ing] Christ in
Christmas."' Id.
38. Id. at 1376 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Mayor's testimony at trial supports Justice Bren-
nan's conclusion that the city's approval of the religious nature of the symbol was clear. The Mayor
1985]
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dorsement of religion.3 9
The Lynch Court turned to prior decisons for guidance in applying the sec-
ond prong of the test-the "effect" prong.4° Chief Justice Burger did not "dis-
cern a greater aid to religion deriving from inclusion of the creche than from
.. .benefits and endorsements previously held not violative of the Establish-
ment Clause."' 41 Therefore, he concluded that the inclusion of the creche pro-
duced a constitutionally permissible effect in that it neither advanced nor
inhibited religion.42
Justice Brennan criticized the majority's analysis because he found the
"clear religious effect of the creche" inescapable. 43 He noted that the city itself
stressed the importance of the creche by placing it in a central location in the
display44 and that the city had not "disclaim[ed] government approval of the
religious significance of the creche." 4 5 Even though the creche was surrounded
by secular objects, it retained a specifically Christian meaning.46 Therefore, the
effect on religious minorities was pronounced and improper; it was a step "to-
ward establishing the sectarian preference of the majority at the expense of the
minority."'47
Chief Justice Burger summarily dispensed with the third prong of the
Lemon test48 because neither the district court nor the court of appeals had
found excessive entanglement resulting from inclusion of the creche.4 9 He did
note, however, that a litigant cannot initiate a lawsuit and then use that lawsuit
as evidence of divisiveness and entanglement.50
stated that "for him, as well as others in the City, the effort to eliminate the nativity scene. . 'is a
step towards establishing another religion, non-religion that it may be.'" Id. at 1373 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
39. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 1363.
41. Id. at 1364; see infra notes 62-64, 66-68 and accompanying text; see also Lynch, 104 S. Ct.
at 1363 nn.8-11 (citing specific language from prior cases in which the Court admitted that the
challenged activity benefited religion and nevertheless upheld the activity).
42. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1364.
43. Id. at 1376 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
44. Id. (Brennan J., dissenting). Justice Brennan added:
[D]espite the small amount of ground covered by the creche, viewers would not regard the
creche as an insignificant part of the display. It is an almost life sized tableau marked off
by a white picket fence. Furthermore, its location lends the creche significance ...
Although the Court recognizes that one cannot see the creche from all possible vantage
points,. . . people standing at the two bus shelters [outside the park] and looking down at
the display will see the creche centrally and prominently positioned.
Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1176-77 (D.R.I. 1981),
aff'd, 691 F.2d 1029 (lst Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S.Ct. 1355 (1984)).
45. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan referred to Allen v. Morton, 495 F.2d 65, 67.
68 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam), in which the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia had allowed the "Pageant of Peace" on federal parkland to include a creche, but only on
the condition that the federal government display "explanatory plaques" refuting any government
support of the religious beliefs associated with the creche. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1376 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
46. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1377 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see supra notes 19 & 32.
47. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1386 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
48. See id. at 1364-65.
49. See id.
50. Id.
[Vol. 63
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The Court in Lynch departed from the Lemon test by applying it in a super-
ficial manner.5 ' This is evident from the Court's failure to counter or even ad-
dress previously established analyses pertaining to each prong of the test that,
had they been applied, would have produced a different result.
In Abington School District v. Schempp,5 2 Justice Brennan articulated a lim-
itation to the first prong of the Lemon test: "[G]overnment may not employ
religious means to serve secular interests, however legitimate they may be, at
least without the clearest demonstration that nonreligious means will not suf-
fice." 53 Thus, if a secular purpose motivates a government's activity, secular
means must be used to effectuate this purpose if they exist.
The Supreme Court relied on this limitation in striking down the govern-
ment's activity in the recent case of Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc.5 4 The contro-
versy in Larkin involved a Massachusetts statute that vested in churches the
power to prevent the issuance of liquor licenses to premises located near them.
The Court stated that the valid secular purpose-restricting alcohol consump-
tion near places of worship-could "be readily accomplished by other means"; 55
thus, the religious means employed by the government were invalid. The Lynch
Court, however, merely relegated its analysis of this "limitation" to a footnote
51. The Court's apparent retreat from the Lemon test may reflect a growing trend. In Marsh v.
Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983), the Court upheld the practice of opening legislative sessions with
prayer without ever applying the Lemon test. See infra note 73 and accompanying text. Further-
more, in Americans United for Separation of Church & State v. School Dist. of Grand Rapids, 718
F.2d 1389 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 104 S. Ct. 1412 (No. 83-6369) (1984), the court of appeals
held that the challenged cooperative educational arrangement violated the establishment clause. The
arrangement allowed students in sectarian schools to take substantive courses from the public school
curriculum at public expense during regular school hours, in sectarian school facilities. Many of the
teachers were or had been employed by the sectarian school. Id. at 1392. The court applied the
Lemon test and found a violation of the first two prongs. Id. at 1410-16. The Supreme Court,
however, has decided to hear this case even though Lemon and Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349
(1975) would seem to govern. The Court's willingness to hear a case so similar to others previously
decided suggests that Court might abandon or modify the Lemon test.
The Lynch Court justified its departure from the Lemon test by referring to Meek and Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971)--cases in which the Court referred to the test as a mere "guide-
line." See supra note 18. The Court's reliance on these cases, however, is questionable. Although
Meek and Tilton referred to the test as a "guideline," their analysis betrayed their words. Meek
upheld the challenged textbook loan program by relying on Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236
(1968). Meek, 421 U.S. at 359. In Allen the Court relied on Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963). Allen, 392 U.S. at 243. In Schempp the Court formulated the first two prongs of
what became the Lemon test. See supra note 14. Therefore, the Meek Court, in its analysis of
textbook loans, fully employed the Lemon test. The Meek Court also held that the provision of the
challenged auxiliary services (testing and related services for exceptional or remedial students) and
instructional materials was unconstitutional because it violated the third prong of the Lemon test-
excessive entanglement. Meek, 421 U.S. at 372. Therefore, the Court did apply the Lemon test, but
because the program clearly violated the third prong of the test, the Court had no need to delve
deeply into an analysis of the other two prongs. In Tilton the Court justified its holding by carefully
distinguishing the case from Lemon; in so doing the Court emphasized the Lemon test itself. Tilton,
403 U.S. at 684-89. Thus, although a trend towards departing from the Lemon test seems apparent,
the Court's reliance on Meek and Tilton to justify this departure is unfounded.
52. 374 U.S. 225 (1963).
53. Id. at 265 (Brennan, J., concurring). This alternative means approach originated in Mc-
Gowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 467 (1967).
54. 459 U.S. 116 (1983).
55. Id. at 124. A legislative zoning ordinance or proper directions to the licensing authority-
secular means-could effectuate this purpose.
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and concluded that even if "the City's objectives could have been achieved with-
out including the creche in the display ... [t]hat is irrelevant."'5 6
This hasty dismissal of the "alternative means" approach exemplifies the
Court's inadequate application of the Lemon test. The test was formed through
a compilation of previous analyses;5 7 it is not self-defining. Prior approaches to
the establishment clause-such as the alternative means limitation-must be in-
corporated into the analysis of each applicable prong for the test to have mean-
ing. Furthermore, although the Court quickly dispensed with the alternative
means limitation, it had employed this very limitation only one term before
Lynch,58 in Larkin.59 Finally, if the Court had applied the limitation, it would
have reached a different result because Pawtucket's secular objectives could have
been accomplished without including the creche in the display.60 Because of
these considerations, Justice Brennan accused the majority of "alter[ing] its
analysis from term to term in order to suit its preferred results."16 1
The Lynch Court analyzed the second prong of the Lemon test in an
equally cursory fashion. Chief Justice Burger relied on Everson v. Board of Edu-
cation,62 Board of Education v. Allen, 63 and Tilton v. Richardson 64-three cases
in which the challenged governmental activity aided religion but the court nev-
ertheless upheld the activity. Everson upheld government reimbursement to par-
ents for transportation costs of children attending sectarian schools. Allen
upheld the lending of textbooks, by public school authorities, free of charge, to
all students, including those in parochial schools. Finally, Tilton upheld federal
grants to college facilities, including church-related institutions of higher educa-
tion. These cases have a common significant element; in each case the Court
stressed that the quality of and access to education in America were crucial
factors in its determination that the challenged activities did not violate the es-
tablishment clause. 65
56. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1363 n.7; see Van Alstyne, supra note 1, at 785 n.77 (noting this
inconsistency).
57. See supra note 14.
58. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1372 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see supra note 52 and accompanying
text (discussion of Schempp alternative means limitation).
59. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
60. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1342 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan noted that "several
representatives of Pawtucket's business community testified that although the overall. . . display
played an important role in promoting downtown holiday trade, the display would serve this pur-
pose equally well even if the creche were removed." Id. at 1373 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 1372 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
62. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
63. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
64. 403 U.S. 672 (1970).
65. The Court in Everson recognized the state's interest in protecting "school children's wel-
fare." Everson, 330 U.S. at 17. The reimbursement plan was no more than "a general program to
help parents get their children, regardless of their religion, safely and expeditiously to and from
accredited schools." Id. at 18 (emphasis added). Even with the emphasis on the importance of
education in America, four Justices dissented (Justices Jackson, Rutledge, Burton, and Frankfurter).
See id. at 18, 28. The Allen Court noted that "private education has played and is playing a signifi-
cant and valuable role in raising national levels of knowledge. . . ." Allen, 392 U.S. at 247. Even
though the Court stressed the value of education, three Justices dissented (Justices Black, Douglas,
and Fortas). See id. at 250, 254, 269. Finally, although the Tilton decision upheld financial aid to
[Vol. 63
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Although the Lynch Court relied on the Everson line of cases, it failed to
note that in those prior decsions the Court had emphasized that the sectarian
effect-the aid to religion-was coupled with a strong secular effect-the better-
ment of education. The Court in the Everson line of cases appeared to be more
tolerant of a closer nexus between religion and government if the toleration re-
sulted in aiding the American educational system. The inclusion of the creche in
Lynch, however, did not improve the quality of education or even relate to
education.
The Lynch Court also noted McGowan v. Maryland,66 Walz v. Tax Com-
mission,67 and Marsh v. Chambers 68 as additional examples of cases in which
valid governmental activities had the effect of aiding religion. In these cases,
however, the Court had emphasized a compelling historical justification for the
activity; this historical justification overrode the activity's religious effect. 69
Each case focused on the specific challenged act and its acceptance throughout
American history.70 Thus, the Court in Walz noted "the undeviating accept-
ance given religious tax exemptions from our earliest days as a Nation. ' '7 1 The
Court in McGowan noted that Sunday closing laws existed at the time Madison
fought for the first amendment; nonetheless, he had not objected to these laws.72
In Marsh the Court noted that throughout American history, "the practice of
legislative prayer has coexisted with the principles of disestablishment and reli-
gious freedom." 73
Chief Justice Burger's Lynch opinion presented examples of the govern-
ment's "official acknowledgement . .. of the role of religion in American
life," 74 rather than focusing on the specific challenged activity-the inclusion of
church-related higher institutions of education, three Justices dissented (Justices Black, Douglas,
and Marshall). See Tilton, 403 U.S. at 689.
These split decisions illustrate that even when the strong secular purpose of promoting educa-
tion is present, the Court is divided as to whether the government may aid indirectly a religious
institution.
66. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
67. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
68. 103 S. Ct. 3330 (1983).
69. Justice Brennan, dissenting in Marsh, noted that a historical analysis has its risk "in light of
certain. . . skeletons in the congressional closet." Id. at 3347 n.30 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He
mentioned a statute enacted by the first Congress that required persons convicted of certain crimes
to be "publicly whipped, not exceeding thirty-nine stripes" and a statute, enacted one week after
Congress proposed the fourteenth amendment to the States, that approved racial segregation of pub-
lic schools in the District of Columbia. Id. These references indicate that Justice Brennan did not
find historical analysis as persuasive as did the majority.
70. "[P]rior cases have all recognized that the 'illumination' provided by history must always
be focused on the particular practice at issue in a given case." Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1386 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
71. Walk, 397 U.S. at 681 (upholding tax exemptions for church property).
72. McGowan, 366 U.S. at 438-40.
73. Marsh, 103 S. Ct. at 3333. The Court found the historical justification for opening legisla-
tive sessions with prayer so compelling that it did not apply any part of the Lemon test. See supra
note 51.
74. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1360. Chief Justice Burger pointed to the following examples of this
"official acknowledgment": Thanksgiving as a religious and national holiday, "In God We Trust"
printed on currency, "One Nation Under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance, publicly funded art
galleries containing masterpieces of religious events, and chapels in the Capitol. Id. at 1360-61.
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a creche in a publicly funded Christmas display. Unlike Sunday closing laws in
McGowan, tax exemptions in Walz, and legislative prayers in Marsh, the inclu-
sion of a creche in governmental Christmas celebrations does not have "an un-
broken history of widespread acceptance."' 75 No analogous historical
justification existed for the Lynch Court to rely on the McGowan line of cases.
Because of this faulty use of historical analysis, Justice Brennan accused the
majority of "select[ing] random elements of America's varied history. . . to suit
the views of five Members of th[e] Court." 76
The misapplication of the Everson and McGowan lines of cases supports
Justice Brennan's characterization of the decision as "careless." 77 The majority
nevertheless relied on those cases as its sole basis for concluding that the inclu-
sion of the creche did not violate the Lemon test's effect prong.
Lynch's focus on the Everson and McGowan lines of cases also obscures
other valid establishment clause concerns. The Court in Schempp had noted
another approach to the "effect" prong-the effect of the government's activity
on religious minorities. 78 Schempp held that no state law or school board rule
may require passages from the Bible or the Lord's prayer to be read or recited in
public schools.79 The Court noted that the King James version of the Bible
differed from, for example, the Jewish Holy Scriptures; therefore, the effect on
religious minorities would be impermissible because these recitations and read-
ings would result in government approval and advancement of one religion-
Christianity.8 0 One year before the Schempp decision, the Court in Engel v.
Vitale 8 1-another school prayer case-had forcefully articulated this concern:
"When the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind
a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minori-
ties to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain."1
8 2
Chief Justice Burger did not address the effect that inclusion of a creche in
the display would have on religious minorities. This omission was inappropri-
ate. Unlike the nondenominational prayer in Engel,8 3 a creche embodies the
75. Id. at 1385 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan, referring to the public financing of
displays that included nativity scenes, stated: "It is. . . impossible to tell ... whether the practice
ever gained widespread acceptance, much less official endorsement, until the twentieth century." Id.
at 1386 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 1386 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
77. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
78. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 219-10. Justice Black, dissenting in,411en, also focused on the protec-
tion of minority religious groups. Allen, 392 U.S. at 254 (Black, J., dissenting).
79. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 223. The fact that individual students could be excused from such
readings by written request of their parents did not alter the Court's decision. The Schempps did not
have their children excused from class because they believed "that the children's relationship with
their teachers and classmates would be adversely affected." Id. at 208.
80. The Court recognized that "from the standpoint of Jewish faith, the concept of Jesus as the
Son of God was 'practically blasphemous' " and the King James version of the Bible depicts Jesus as
such. Id. at 209.
81. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
82. Id. at 431. The school prayer was held unconstitutional even though it was nondenomina-
tional and voluntary. Id. at 430.
83. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
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tenets of one religion-Christianity.84 Justice Brennan illustrated the signifi-
cance this analysis would have had if it had been applied in Lynch. He argued
that the creche affected both religious minorities and nonbelievers; it "con-
vey[ed] the message that their views are not similarly worthy of public recogni-
tion nor entitled to public support."'8 5 The "religious chauvinism" '86 that results
from such a government action contravenes the notion that the government can-
not advance or inhibit religion. s7 Thus, if a government action has a detrimental
effect on religious minorities, the effect prong of the Lemon test is violated-
government is advancing the majority religion while inhibiting minority
religions.
Another analysis omitted from the Lynch decision pertains to both of the
first two prongs of the Lemon test, and was used by the Court in cases dealing
with government aid to parochial schools.8 8 The Court noted in Allen that pa-
rochial schools have a dual function; "parochial schools . . . , in addition to
their sectarian function, perform the task of secular education."8 9 If a govern-
ment's action has a secular purpose-to support the quality of the American
educational system-and if the government aids parochial schools only in the
performance of their secular function, then no violation of the establishment
clause has occurred.90 The purpose prong and the effect prong both would be
84. Justice Brennan noted the creche's embodiment of only Christian beliefs. "The essence of
the creche's symbolic purpose and effect is to prompt the observer to experience a sense of simple
awe and wonder appropriate to the contemplation of one of the central elements of Christian
dogma-that God sent His son into the world to be a Messiah." Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1378-79
(Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1165-68 (D.R.I. 1981)
(creche discussed as a purely religious symbol), aff'd, 691 F.2d 1029 (Ist Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct.
1355 (1984).
85. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1373 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Although Schempp and Engel both
dealt with impressionable children of lower grade school age, these cases apply to Lynch because the
display appeared particularly suited for young children. See supra note 19.
86. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1374 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
87. See supra note 16. Even when the Court has stressed its belief in the strong role of religion
in American life, it has continued to accept the need for government neutrality. For example, in
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), the Court noted: "We are a religious people whose institu-
tions presuppose a Supreme Being." Id. at 313. The Court, however, went on to note that "govern-
ment must be neutral when it comes to competition between sects." Id. at 314.
88. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
89. Allen, 392 U.S. at 248. The Court noted that the secular and sectarian aspects of parochial
schools were capable of being separated. The two aspects are not so "intertwined that the secular
textbooks furnished to students by the public are in fact instrumental in the teaching of religion."
Id. This view, however, was not met with unanimous support. Justice Douglas found that textbooks
might contain religious dogma and one cannot separate books neatly into secular and religious cate-
gories. He noted that textbooks were different from school transportation-the controversy in Ever-
son-because "[w]hatever may be said of Everson, there is nothing ideological about a bus." Id. at
257 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
90. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 663 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing
Allen, 392 U.S. at 248). In Lemon, however, the Court realized that the challenged salary support to
teachers in parochial schools was government assistance that could not aid the secular function of
parochial schools without also aiding the sectarian function. Id. at 619. Justice Douglas insisted
that any government aid to parochial schools violated the establishment clause. Id. at 640 (Douglas,
J., dissenting). Although he conceded that parochial schools perform a dual function, he refuted the
notion that these functions could be separated. Id. at 641 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Rutledge
recognized this problem in 1947 when he acknowledged the "admixture of religious with secular
teaching in all such institutions." Everson, 330 U.S. at 47 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). He went on to
state that "commingling the religious with the secular teaching does not divest the whole of its
religious permeation. . . . Indeed, on any other view, the constitutional prohibition always could be
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satisfied because the only aid given by the government would be to the secular
aspects embedded within sectarian schools.
If Chief Justice Burger had analyzed the dual aspects of Christmas he
would have reached a different result in Lynch. 9 1
[Tjhe Christmas holiday in our national culture contains both secular
and sectarian elements. To say that the government may recognize the
holiday's traditional, secular elements of gift-giving, public festivities
and community spirit, does not mean that government may indiscrimi-
nately embrace the distinctively sectarian aspects of the holiday. 92
The creche symbolizes solely the sectarian aspect of Christmas.93 Therefore, the
display, had it not included the creche, would not have violated either of the first
two prongs of the Lemon test; the secular purpose of promoting goodwill and
increasing commercial activity would have been achieved without the prohibited
effect of advancing religion.94 Because Chief Justice Burger failed to separate
Christmas into its secular and sectarian features, his reasoning was erroneous
and simplistic. Rather than addressing the issue, Chief Justice Burger begged
the question by noting that, "[i]f the presence of the creche . . . violates the
Establishment Clause, a host of other forms of taking official note of Christmas
. . . are equally offensive to the Constitution."9 5
Chief Justice Burger's analysis of the third prong also exemplifies the
Court's superficial application of the Lemon test. Although the mere potential
for divisiveness or entanglement never has been a sufficient basis for invalidating
a challenged governmental activity,96 previous decisions have acknowledged
that this potential represents a "warning signal" that the evils 97 which the estab-
lishment clause sought to prevent may be surfacing.98 The district court deter-
brought to naught by adding a modicum of the secular." Id. (Rutledge, J., dissenting). The Court
in Tilton, however, insisted that federal subsidies to church-related institutions could be separated
because the "federal subsidized facilities would be devoted to the secular and not the religious func-
tion of the recipient institution." Tilton, 403 U.S. at 679.
91. The district court in Lynch noted the dual aspects of Christmas in concluding that the
inclusion of the nativity scene in a government display was unconstitutional. Donnelly v. Lynch,
525 F. Supp. 1150, 1165-68, aff'd, 691 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
92. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1378 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
93. The district court in Lynch acknowledged the solely religious nature of the creche. "The
court does not understand what meaning the creche, as a symbol, can have other than a religious
meaning." Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1167, aff'd, 691 F.2d 1029 (Ist Cir. 1982), rev'd,
104 S. Ct. 1355 (1984). Furthermore, Justice Brennan described the creche as a "mystical re-crea-
tion of an event that lies at the heart.of Christian faith." Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1379 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); see supra note 80.
94. This idea is implicit in Justice Brennan's dissent. See Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1377-80 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 1365.
96. Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1180, aff'd, 691 F.2d 1029 (Ist Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104
S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
97. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
98. Meek, 421 U.S. at 372; Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 798; Lemon, 403 U.S. at 625 (Douglas, J.,
concurring). The Court in Nyquist emphasized the significance of this "warning signal." "While the
prospect of such divisiveness may not alone warrant the invalidation of state laws. . . it is certainly
a 'warning signal' not to be ignored." Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 797-98 (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 625
(Douglas, J., concurring)).
Justice Brennan in his Lynch dissent noted that after the Lynch decision other religious sects
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mined that the inclusion of the creche might result in future divisiveness. 99
Chief Justice Burger, however, failed to recognize this warning signal. This
omission not only illustrates the Court's unwillingness to adhere to the Lemon
test but also suggests the Court's lack of commitment to the notion of a "high
and impregnable wall between church and state.' ' 1°° When confronted by a
warning signal that the establishment clause might be jeopardized, Chief Justice
Burger not only failed to mention the "flare" but vigorously upheld the activ-
ity-the inclusion of the creche-that prompted the warning.
The Court in Lynch, by applying the Lemon test in this superficial manner,
renders the test ineffectual. The Lynch decision indicates that the Court may
abandon the Lemon test altogether, or at least continue to apply it only in a
skeletal form to achieve a preordained result. This development would leave the
Court without a meaningful tool for determining whether a violation of the es-
tablishment clause has occurred. The final result would be a new and troubling
vision of the wall of separation between church and state-a disappearing wall
that the court could erect or dismantle at will.
HARRIET GRANT
may press for inclusion of their religious symbols within publicly funded displays. The Mayor had
remarked that he would include a Menorah in future displays. This statement may increase the
likelihood that various religious groups will seek to have their religions represented by the govern-
ment. Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1374 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The likelihood that religious groups will continue to seek recognition of their religious symbols
in government displays or on public land already has become a reality. The Supreme Court has
heard a case brought against the Village of Scarsdale following the village's denial of an application
to display a creche in a public park during the Christmas season. McCreary v. Stone, 739 F.2d 716
(2d Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Board of Trustees v. McCreary, 53 U.S.L.W. 3289 (U.S. Oct. 15,
1984) (No. 84-277).
99. Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1180, aff'd, 691 F.2d 1029 (Ist Cir. 1982), rev'd, 104
S. Ct. 1355 (1984).
100. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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